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The Devolution of Conservatism: From Edmund Burke to Donald Trump 
There is much talk these days about the need to find unity and common ground in our 
politics so we can come together and “get things done” for the American people. But for this talk 
to be anything more than facile, we need to delineate the ideological viewpoints that are in need 
of communicative discourse. In this article I focus on conservatism, with an eye toward 
understanding how the type of conservatism advanced by Edmund Burke, who is regarded as its 
philosophical founder, has little to do with the conservatism that has come to dominate the 
contemporary Republican Party. 
 Let us begin with the influential essay titled “Conservatism is Dead,” published by 
historian Sam Tanenhaus in The New Republic in February 2009, just a month after Barack 
Obama was inaugurated as president.1 “What passes for conservatism today,” wrote Tanenhaus, 
“would be incomprehensible to its originator, Edmund Burke.”2 The Dublin-born Burke, who 
served in the British House of Commons from 1766 to 1794, had a distrust of totalizing 
ideologies and warned against the “destabilizing perils of revolutionary politics” that “placed an 
idea of the perfect society over and above the need to improve society as it really existed.” Yet, 
he believed that “governments were obligated to use their powers to meliorate intolerable 
conditions” and that “a state without the means of some change is without the means of 
conservation.” As Burke said, those who aspire to be statesmen must be able to combine “a 
disposition to preserve and an ability to improve.”3 
In his essay, Tanenhaus identifies two main strains of conservatism in the United States. 
In the tradition of Burke, a consensus-driven “realist” strain that believes in compromise and 
understands government as playing a positive role in adjusting to changing conditions, and a 
“revanchist” strain that has a profound distrust of government and is dedicated to sowing social 
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division by mobilizing grievances and resentments about a lost past. The former seeks to 
“conserve,” while the latter seeks to “destroy.”  
 Revanchism is a concept derived from the French term for revenge and connotes the 
desire to regain lost territory. It is akin to “reactionary,” which Andrew Sullivan describes as an 
acute despair with the present historical moment and a desire to reverse course backward, a 
counterrevolution, to an imagined golden age before “everything went to hell. … It is not simply 
a conservative preference for things as they are, with a few nudges back, but a passionate 
loathing of the status quo,” resentment toward those who they think maintain it, and a desire to 
blow everything up before the old order can be reinstated.4 
 According to Tanenhaus, conservatism at its best serves “the vital function of clarifying 
our shared connection to the past and of giving articulate voice to the normative beliefs 
Americans have striven to maintain even in the worst of times.”5 It asserts that a large majority 
of Americans have a deep attachment to the existing society and will be resistant to challenges to 
its legitimacy. E. J. Dionne adds that a healthy democratic society “needs conservatism’s 
skepticism about the grand plans that progressives sometimes offer, its respect for traditional 
institutions, and skepticism of those who believe politics can remold human nature.”6 However, 
that temperamental wariness of dramatic change is not inflexible and is open to ideas for 
correcting flaws in the social order. As Dionne suggests, “a conservatism that accepted the 
responsibility of conserving the genuine achievements of progressive reform … [and] 
government programs that have stood the test of time … would be truer to its own tradition than 
a reform of reaction dedicated to rooting out all vestiges of the liberal government that now 
exists.”  
 We should recall that the Republican Party originated as the party of Abraham Lincoln 
and includes progressives like Theodore Roosevelt and moderates like Dwight Eisenhower. 
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What Eisenhower called the “Middle Way,” in his words, “between untrammeled freedom of the 
individual and the demands of the welfare of the whole Nation … [that] is the proper function of 
the federal government,” comes closer to describing Democrats like Bill Clinton and Barack 
Obama than to most Republicans today.7 Dionne notes that Democrats have “taken over the role 
that was once played by moderate and liberal Republicans,” with the effect of pushing the 
contemporary Republican Party “toward ever greater philosophical homogeneity” on the far-
right end of the political spectrum.8 Indeed, research finds that the shift in the so-called “center” 
of American politics has been asymmetrical, that is, it is accounted for more by an actual 
rightward shift of the Republican Party rather than by a purported leftward shift of the 
Democratic Party.9 
 Obviously, Burkean conservatism is not the strain that is flourishing in the Republican 
Party of Donald Trump, nor has it been for a long time. This is why so many Republicans—
derisively dubbed RINOS (Republicans in Name Only) by the revanchists—have abandoned 
their former political home. Stuart Stevens, one of the most successful Republican consultants of 
his generation, is one of the disaffected. He was even compelled to write a book, It Was All a 
Lie, published in 2020, which is a lament about the political party he once thought actually stood 
for a set of conservative principles that he now thinks are mere “marketing slogans.”10 
Importantly, Stevens admits, “There is nothing strange or unexpected about Donald 
Trump. He is the logical conclusion of what the Republican Party became over the last fifty or so 
years.” Moreover, writes Robert Reich in The Common Ground, “Trump has brought us back to 
first principles … [and] got us talking about democracy versus tyranny. … [B]y dint of his 
pugnacious character and the divisiveness he has fueled, [he] raises the question of what 
connects us, of what we hold in common.”11 
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 In this article, I consider how this all came to be, with a focus on contemporary 
conservatism’s component parts: its economic, racial, religious-cultural, national security, and 
politically strategic elements. Taken as a whole, this account constitutes an examination of what 
some call “Movement Conservatism,” a coalition of diverse interest groups and ideological 
dispositions united in the conviction that the growth of “big government” constitutes the most 
serious problem of our time.12 As President Ronald Reagan famously said in his first inaugural 
address in 1981: “Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem. ... 
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the federal establishment and to demand 
recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the federal government and those 
reserved to the states or to the people.”13 
The Resurrection of Laissez-faire Capitalism 
One of the core components of contemporary conservatism are the business elites who 
want to dismantle the federal regulatory structure and support for worker rights that were 
implemented during the Progressive and New Deal eras of the early twentieth century, which had 
enjoyed a fair degree of bipartisan consensus until the 1970s. In its place, these elites want to 
resurrect the laissez-faire “free market” economy of the late nineteenth century, a time of 
growing corporate consolidation and economic inequality, a type of capitalism that tends to 
disregard the moral and human costs of unchecked avarice and permits individual self-interest to 
run amok. This entails opposition to any form of centralized economic planning—whether in a 
government-interventionist capitalist system or a communist system—because in their view the 
former is a slippery slope to the latter. It also rejects the insights first advanced by British 
economist John Maynard Keynes, that government spending can be viewed as an investment of 
public resources that are useful for stimulating economic activity when capitalist markets on 
their own do not provide sufficient employment and income for working people.14  
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 A seminal document of this movement is the 1971 memo prepared by Lewis Powell for 
the US Chamber of Commerce titled “Attack on American Free Enterprise System.” Powell was 
a corporate lawyer with ties to the tobacco industry who was soon to be appointed by President 
Richard Nixon to the US Supreme Court. His memo was a clarion call to the business 
community to mobilize with organized joint funding a counter-ideological “guerrilla war” to 
recapture public opinion away “from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual 
and literary journals, the arts and sciences … [and] politicians” that were undermining the 
capitalist system.15 
Arguably the intellectual center of this economic conservatism has its origin among 
economists at the University of Chicago who were influenced by the work of the Austrian 
economist Friedrich Hayek. In the midst of World War II, Hayek published The Road to 
Serfdom, in which he warned about the perils of too much centralization of economic activity 
under the auspices of a national government.16 This line of thinking was further advanced by 
University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman. In his book Capitalism and Freedom, 
Friedman argued that the preservation of free market capitalism was necessary for the 
maintenance of political freedom and that regulated markets were a threat to individual liberty.17 
This view actually derives from the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, although the 
invocation of liberalism to contemporary American ears will be confusing since it is typically 
understood to mean a political position that is left of center.  
 Other terms that complicate the conversation about conservative economics are 
libertarianism and neoliberalism. Libertarianism is a term that may connote advocacy of 
personal choice in areas such as recreational drug use, for example, but its economic theory is 
laissez-faire capitalism, while neoliberalism is a term that is advanced by progressive critics of 
this economic system. Robert Kuttner believes it is important to appreciate that pure laissez-faire 
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economics is rather “nonsensical” insofar as it is the government that establishes the rules of the 
market in areas such as credit, contracts, bankruptcy, patents, taxation, and so forth.18 “The 
political question is who gets to make the rules, and for whose benefit.” 19 For Kuttner, 
neoliberalism connotes a comprehensive political agenda for deregulating the economy, 
weakening unions to lower the cost of labor, and privatizing public services. It also entails 
international rules by which cross-national commerce is conducted. 
 Whatever it is called, it is noteworthy that free market or free enterprise capitalism is also 
the system mythologized in the novels of the Russian-American immigrant Ayn Rand, who is 
much admired by conservatives such as former Wisconsin Congressman Paul Ryan, who served 
in the House of Representatives from 1999 to 2016, was Mitt Romney’s vice presidential 
running mate in 2012, and Speaker of the House from 2015 to 2019.20 In her novels, in Stevens’s 
words, Rand offered a “vision of strong men fighting against the burdensome yoke of 
collectivism and government oppression.”21 Rand, like her fellow travelers, believed that the 
freedom of individuals to pursue their economic self-interest unimpeded by government will 
benefit the overall well-being of society, a view that goes back to the British economist Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations in the late eighteenth century.22 Rand went so far as to say that 
selfishness is a higher moral calling than altruism. 
 It is important to underscore the Social Darwinist ideology associated with this line of 
economic thinking. Social Darwinists believe that government should not interfere in the age-old 
“survival of the fittest” evolutionary struggle, and they justify economic and racial inequality by 
attributing it to people’s natural abilities (or lack thereof) to compete for scarce resources. In 
other words, the elites and plutocrats of the world have earned their positions of wealth and 
power because they possess superior abilities, while those with inferior abilities are deserving of 
their lesser status. Moreover, government attempts to help the undeserving only creates 
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disincentives for them to work hard to improve their lot in life. This is but one indication of the 
cruel world envisioned by this revanchist strain of contemporary conservatism.23 
 Social Darwinism aside, it is also important to understand the assumptions made by 
conservative economists who justify this type of economic order, assumptions that Joseph 
Stiglitz, one of their most cogent critics, thinks are “in accord with neither reality nor modern 
advances in economics.”24 These economists presume that private markets are self-regulating 
and the most efficient means of allocating goods and services, and that government interference 
introduces inefficiencies, distorts the laws of supply and demand, and stifles innovation. Stiglitz 
disputes these premises, noting that they presuppose the existence of markets that are competitive 
(rather than dominated by monopolies and oligopolies), that economic actors have equal access 
to information about market conditions (they do not), and that the consequential actions are 
without externalities (negative side effects) such as inequality, poverty, workplace hazards, 
harmful products, and environmental degradation. Moreover, both Smith and Hayek believed— 
unlike those who justify their views in their names—that government has an important role to 
play in regulating markets and ensuring that private gain is aligned with the broader public good. 
As Hayek wrote in his Constitution of Liberty (1960), “Probably nothing has done so much 
harm” to the profession of economics as the “wooden insistence … [on] the principle of laissez-
faire capitalism.”25 
The Question of Race 
Another core element of Movement Conservatism revolves around the question of race, 
and exploitation of this issue has been a key element of the Republican Party’s turn to revanchist 
conservatism since the 1950s. It is worth recalling that the landmark US Supreme Court decision 
of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which ruled that school desegregation was 
unconstitutional, was a unanimous decision of the Court during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl 
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Warren, a Republican governor who was appointed by Eisenhower. Until that time, White 
supremacists who opposed racial equality had found a home in the southern Dixiecrat wing of 
the Democratic Party, which had been part of the New Deal coalition (as long as it maintained 
White supremacy). Now this fealty to the Democratic Party, tied to the legacy of opposition to 
Lincoln Republicanism, began to wane.26      
 In 1955, the National Review magazine was established with the goal of advancing, 
systematizing, and making conservative intellectual thought respectable. William Buckley, its 
founder and first editor, was a staunch segregationist. In 1957 he wrote, “The central question 
that emerges … is whether the White community in the South is entitled to take such measures 
as are necessary to prevail, politically and culturally, in areas in which it does not predominate 
numerically? The sobering answer is Yes—the White community is so entitled because, for the 
time being, it is the advanced race.”27 Stevens puts this statement in stark relief: “The National 
Review, as the unofficial beating heart of the American conservative movement, was committed 
to the principle that a ‘white’ culture was superior to all others.”28 Today, the conservative 
position seems to be that “race doesn’t matter” any more, that anyone can succeed, and that 
“being black in America is actually an advantage because government and society treat blacks 
with a differential preference.”29 
 In the early 1960s, when Democratic presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson lent 
their support to the burgeoning civil rights movement, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, the 
Republican nominee for president in 1964, led a party that was opposed to this Burkean 
correction to the existing racial order. This assertion of White supremacy was framed in the 
coded language of “state’s rights,” but the endorsement of segregation was clear. Goldwater 
believed, in his words, that it was “the responsibility of the states,” not the federal government, 
to decide whether or not to racially integrate schools. “I am firmly convinced not only that 
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integrated schools are not required but that the Constitution does not permit any interference 
whatsoever by the Federal government in the field of education.”30 
When President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he told an aide, Bill 
Moyers, “I think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.”31 
Johnson, who heralded from Texas, knew his fellow southerners, and hence began the mass 
exodus of the South from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. 
During the presidential campaign of 1968, campaign aides to Republican candidate 
Richard Nixon encouraged him to pursue a “southern strategy” for winning the election by 
appealing to the racial views of the region. Following a period of urban riots by Black Americans 
who were angered and frustrated about police brutality and thwarted expectations for racial 
equality, Nixon exploited a coded message of “law and order” to persuade Southern Democrats 
(and voters across the country) that the Republican Party was now the party that supported their 
interests. In that election, American Independent Party candidate George Wallace, a Democratic 
governor from Alabama, received 13.5 percent of the national vote while explicitly advocating 
for racial segregation. Nixon won the election over the Democratic candidate, Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey, by less than one percent of the vote, but without the Wallace candidacy, 
Nixon would have won by a landslide. From this point on, especially as the Democratic Party 
pursued involuntary busing of school children and affirmative action as part of its civil rights 
agenda, the Republican Party positioned itself to appeal to White voters who opposed this 
program.32 
 More recently, in the age of Donald Trump, the populist base of the Republican Party has 
become a revanchist constituency motivated largely by White grievance. Whiteness is viewed as 
a birthright that is under attack by multicultural forces using political correctness, cancel culture, 
and bogus claims about social justice to usurp the rights of White people and undermine 
9
Berger: Extended Commentary: The Devolution of Conservatism: From Edmund Burke to Donald Trump
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2021
American society. Nonwhite immigrants and other undeserving racial minorities are “cutting in 
line,” gaining unfair advantages, and taking opportunities away from hardworking White 
Americans who have been waiting patiently for their share of the American dream.33 
Moreover, the White supremacist orientation of this movement, and its connection to 
armed militia groups and the so-called Alt-Right, have become more visible.34 Through his 
coded and explicit rhetoric, Trump has made bigotry more acceptable and lent his endorsement 
to White supremacists. Let us recall the murder of antiracist protestor Heather Hyer by White 
supremacists shouting “Jews will not replace us,” and Trump’s reference to the “good people” 
who were on both sides of the Charlottesville, Virginia, rally in August 2017. Then there was the 
October 2020 presidential debate in which he told the Proud Boys to “stand back and stand by.” 
These Trump supporters have shown they will not hesitate to use violence, as witnessed by the 
January 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection. Even before then, in October 2018, there were the 
attempted mass murders by Cesar Sayoc Jr., who mailed pipe bombs to fifteen prominent liberals 
(with plans to send more to others), including Barack and Michelle Obama, Bill and Hillary 
Clinton, and George Soros. That same month, Robert Bowers killed eleven Jewish worshipers at 
the Tree of Life Congregation in Pittsburgh. Although Bowers appeared to be critical of Trump 
for being a “globalist,” in the closing days of the November 2018 midterm Congressional 
campaign, Trump took great pains to clarify that he was not a “globalist” but a “nationalist.” 
Race and Economics in the World of Ronald Reagan 
Goldwater lost the 1964 election to President Johnson by a wide margin, but his 
supporters were in it for the long haul. Ronald Reagan was the standard bearer, and he brought 
the Goldwater agenda into the mainstream of American politics and the US government when he 
won the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984. Importantly, Stevens believes “there is a direct 
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line from the more genteel prejudice of Ronald Reagan to the white nationalism of Donald 
Trump.”35  
 In his unsuccessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, Reagan 
introduced his now infamous attack on “welfare queens” that was not too coded language, writes 
Stevens, when “white voters heard it and understood the unspoken accusation just as they did 
when George Wallace did the same.”36 The welfare queen in Reagan’s story was a Black woman 
in Chicago who, in Reagan’s words, “used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to 
collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran 
husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a 
year.”37 
 Stevens assumes that Reagan learned of this woman from articles that had appeared two 
years earlier in the Chicago Tribune and Jet magazine. As it turns out, this woman had “used 
four, not eighty names, and the total fraud was $8,000—but when four becomes eighty and 
$8,000 total becomes $150,000 a year, Reagan is just lying.”38 In fact, “the majority of all 
welfare goes to white Americans and always has, but the specificity of a woman in Chicago 
makes the racial appeal clear.” More broadly, and herein lies the view later espoused by the Tea 
Party wing of the Republican Party, hardworking (White) people are being stuck with a tax bill 
to pay for unearned entitlements of undeserving “freeloaders.” In contrast, deserving (White) 
people who receive Social Security and Medicare benefits earned through a lifetime of hard work 
are entitled to what is coming to them.39  
 Beyond his racial views, Reagan was a staunch advocate of free market capitalism and 
the policies that benefit the wealthy and plutocratic class. When Reagan asserted that 
“government is not the solution to our problem … [but] is the problem,” he set about reversing 
the moral message of It’s a Wonderful Life: Capitalists are not the nefarious Mr. Potters of the 
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world but the heroes.40 When rich people get rich everyone prospers; the benefits “trickle down.” 
The academic bedfellow of this view is “supply-side” economics, which George H. W. Bush 
once called “voodoo economics.” In this view, it is not consumer demand that stimulates the 
economy, as Keynes had asserted, but capitalists who supply the jobs, goods, and services. 
(Years later, Republican consultant Frank Lutz coined the term “job creators.”) Increasing these 
capitalist investments requires lower taxes and elimination of burdensome and unnecessary 
government regulations.41  
To be sure, these policies have not been the exclusive province of the Republican Party. 
Matt Stoller reminds us that it was Lloyd Bentsen, a Texas Democratic Senator, who first 
introduced supply-side economics into government circles in a 1980 report of the Joint 
Economic Committee called “Plugging in the Supply Side.” 42 (Eight years later, Bentsen was the 
Democratic nominee for vice president on the ticket with Massachusetts Governor Michael 
Dukakis.) Nor was it Republicans alone who called for the end of “big government.” As Bill 
Clinton said in his State of the Union address in 1996, “the era of big government is over,” 
though he did add that neither can we “go back to the time when our citizens were left to fend for 
themselves.”43 It was Clinton, too, who worked with a Republican Congress to eliminate an 
important financial regulation of the New Deal by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 
which had created a wall of separation between commercial banks and investment banks.44  
 Be that as it may, the main problem with tickle-down/supply-side economics is that it 
does not work. A solid body of research has demonstrated that cutting taxes for corporations and 
the wealthy has not translated into benefits for all but rather has increased economic inequality.45 
Putting more money into the hands of elites leads to more high-end consumption by the 
privileged few, exorbitant pay increases for corporate executives, and stock market speculation. 
In the 1950s, corporations paid for about a third of what it takes to run the federal government; 
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today that share has dropped to well under 10 percent.46 Sometimes corporations use the extra 
money to buy up other companies, increasing the monopolization of the economy. At the same 
time, government revenues for needed programs have been reduced and the national debt has 
increased. 
 These externalities notwithstanding, Reagan and his disciples developed what Stevens 
describes as an almost “spiritual” attachment to tax cuts, which comes “about as close as it can 
be to a definitional core belief” of the Republican Party.47 One of the byproducts of this 
attachment is the group led by Grover Norquist called Americans for Tax Reform, which was 
founded in 1975 with Reagan’s backing. It was Norquist who developed the infamous “Taxpayer 
Protection Pledge,” which asks Republican candidates and officeholders to commit themselves to 
opposing all tax increases.  
Of course, when taxes don’t keep up with government spending, the federal budget 
deficit and long-term debt increase. Although Republicans claim to be the party of fiscal 
restraint, deficits have risen more during Republican than Democratic presidential 
administrations.48 Moreover, Stevens writes, “any pretense that the Republican Party, if only 
given complete control of all three chambers of power, would focus on the deficit was just one of 
the many myths shattered in the first two years of the Trump presidency”—when a tax cut for the 
wealthiest of Americans inevitably lead to a substantial increase in the deficit and debt.49 
God Bless America 
Another part of the Movement Conservative coalition is the group of religious adherents 
variously known as the Christian right, evangelicals, or fundamentalist Christians. Three of the 
leaders who were influential in linking this constituency to the contemporary Republican Party 
and plutocratic class were Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Ralph Reed.50 
13
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Some of the elites in this Christian movement subscribe to an ideology of “biblical 
capitalism,” a derivative of sixteenth century Calvinism, which postulates that the capitalist 
system and the people who succeed in it are favored by God.51 They also tend to take a 
Machiavellian “ends justifies the means” approach to politics. More generally, this strain of 
conservatism asserts that the United States was founded as a Christian nation, that the 
constitutional constraint imposed by the First Amendment prohibition against the establishment 
of religion applies only to the federal government, and that it is permissible for individual states 
to endorse Christian beliefs and values as a matter of public policy.52  
 It is noteworthy that the populist rank-and-file of this movement consists largely of 
people who hold the hitherto mentioned racial views that comprise the base of the contemporary 
Republican Party. It is also a group that tends to live in rural communities and small towns, a 
population that is more likely to be White and Christian than its urban counterpart, as well as 
older and less formally educated.53 Additionally, rural folks are more likely to own guns, enjoy 
hunting as a pastime, and believe that gun control is a slippery slope that will inevitably lead to 
loss of their Second Amendment rights. They are more likely to harbor resentments toward those 
they view as arrogant and condescending liberal elites—the class of people who work in 
government bureaucracies, institutions of higher education, and the mainstream news and 
entertainment media—who they think are out of touch with ordinary working people, rural 
values, and the rural way of life. (In all fairness, liberal arrogance and condescension is a real 
thing.) These are the people whom Sarah Palin, John McCain’s vice-presidential running mate in 
2008, described as the “best of America.” As she said during a campaign visit to Greensboro, 
North Carolina, “We believe that the best of America is in these small towns … and in these 
wonderful little pockets of what I call the real America,” the home of hard working, patriotic, 
and “pro-America” people.54 
14
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In the aftermath of the January 6, 2021, Capitol insurrection, where some of the 
insurrectionists invoked the name of Jesus Christ, Texas lieutenant governor Dan Patrick said 
that “every problem we have in America has a solution in the Bible.”55 But the Bible contains 
contradictory passages, mixed messages, and different emphases that can be interpreted 
selectively for different ideological purposes. The version of evangelicalism associated with the 
contemporary Republican Party tends to focus more on belief in a Jesus who saves personal lives 
through embracement of him as the Lord and Savior and who offers true believers the promise of 
eternal salvation. It is not the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount, Beatitudes, or Good Samaritan 
who teaches about social justice and empathy toward others, especially the downtrodden.56 
 A primary concern of conservative Christians is the purported moral decline of the 
nation, which can only be remedied by recommitting the country to Christian values. Often this 
agenda is couched in the language of family values—that is, patriarchal family values.57 The 
themes and policies that fall under this rubric presume the natural superiority of male-dominated, 
heterosexual two-parent marriages, view non-heterosexuality as unnatural, and oppose abortion 
and non-abstinence sex education for youths. The advocates of this agenda claim to be 
cultivating personal responsibility and virtuous character, but the hypocrisy among some of the 
leaders has been apparent for a long time—whether it’s been the sexual predilections and grift-
taking of evangelical ministers or the financial corruption of Christian lobbyists.58 This was all 
before the embracement of Donald Trump, whom Stevens describes as “the ultimate white 
megachurch preacher.”59 Stevens thinks that the “larger-than-life flaws and sins” of Trump’s 
evangelical predecessors has served to “convince the flock that they are unworthy to judge” 
powerful men. They claim to favor “authenticity” in their leaders but are “drawn to the most 
elaborately artificial” personalities. Needless to say, there is also a disconnect between the desire 
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for religious and personal liberty that is espoused by the Republican Party and the desire for 
government regulation of people’s—especially women’s—bodies that is part of this agenda.  
 In an earlier era, some Christian conservatives, including President George W. Bush, 
were concerned that parts of the Republican coalition were projecting a heartless attitude toward 
the poor and others in need. Their solution was to promote the notion of “compassionate 
conservatism.” However, the primary mechanism for putting compassion into practice was not 
the government but local groups that are closer to the people—religious and other voluntary 
community organizations. All this is well and good, but putting a compassionate face on the 
Republican Party, as Dionne observes, is “not the same as transforming it”—whether it’s a 
genuine compassion for the plight of the less fortunate or a change in attitudes about the ways in 
which government can help people.60 
 One enduring policy outcome of compassionate conservatism has been the creation of the 
White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives, now the Office of Faith-Based 
and Neighborhood Partnerships (OFBNP), during the George W. Bush administration. Its main 
function has been to facilitate the distribution of federal grants to faith-based organizations that 
are engaged in public service, a goal that is controversial enough given the First Amendment. 
But the Bush office was also plagued by scandal regarding the distribution of grants for the 
purpose of shoring up the president’s evangelical base. Though no scandals were forthcoming 
from the Obama administration, during the first two years of the Trump administration the 
OFBNP remained without a director, and then it was replaced with a new White House Faith and 
Opportunity Initiative designed to put faith-based organizations on an equal footing with secular 
organizations when applying for federal funds. Under Joe Biden, the OFBNP has been 
reestablished under its previous leadership.61 
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National Security and the Deep State 
Since the 1950s, one of the hallmarks of the Republican Party has been its hawkish 
approach to national security, especially its foreign policy vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. 
Taken to its extreme, this posture led to the malicious anticommunist crusade of Wisconsin 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, which was wholeheartedly endorsed by William Buckley. In his book 
McCarthy and His Enemies, co-authored with Brent Bozell, Buckley castigated not only 
communists but also liberals who were in his eyes insufficiently opposed to communism.62 He 
also conflated Soviet-style communism with the New Deal. 
 Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, was another anticommunist of that era 
who played an important role in spreading these pernicious ideas and promoting conspiratorial 
thinking more generally. Birch was an American Baptist missionary and military intelligence 
officer who was killed by Chinese communists in 1945. Welch spread the myth that it was the 
US State Department that assassinated Birch to keep him from exposing the communist plot to 
take over China, and that the Eisenhower administration had been infiltrated by communists. 
These claims were a little too far for Buckley, who used the National Review to distance 
Movement Conservatism from the John Birch Society, which he also denounced as anti-Semitic. 
Nonetheless, the seeds of conspiracy thinking that imbues the contemporary Republican Party 
were planted in this earlier period.63 
Of course, the Republican Party of Donald Trump is anything but anti-Russia. I will not 
in this space delve into the details of Trump’s ties to Russian oligarchs, or his admiration for 
autocratic leaders throughout the world,64 but I will note the similarity of the “Trump doctrine” 
to the “America First” movement of the 1940s, an isolationist movement opposed to US 
involvement in World War II and the fight against European fascism. In some ways, Trump’s 
“soft on Russia” stance, criticism of NATO, and desire to withdraw US troops from Europe are 
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of a kind with this orientation and one reason he has been opposed by hawkish neoconservative 
Republicans like William Kristol, who believe that the United States should assert its power in 
international affairs, including through the use of military force. The Trump doctrine also entails 
revanchist hostility toward international initiatives and institutions more generally, as witnessed 
by the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, Iran nuclear deal, and the World Health 
Organization.65 
 In the world of Trump, it is not communism or even terrorism that is threatening the 
United States but the so-called “deep state” festering in the bowels of the federal government. As 
such, Trump dedicated himself to depriving the government of its diplomatic, scientific, and 
managerial personnel.66 Michael Lewis describes this group of skilled experts as the people who 
administer a complicated “portfolio of risks” in the areas of national security—broadly construed 
to include foreign policy, terrorism, cybersecurity, natural disasters, and public health, including 
pandemics—that no private person or corporation can handle on its own.67 Moreover, the 
Trumpian approach was a policy of willful ignorance, that is, “the desire not to know. … If your 
ambition is to maximize short-term gain without regard to long-term costs, you are better off not 
knowing the cost.” Besides, capitalist entrepreneurs will take care of everything if they are just 
left alone. Government should get out of the way and let the free market perform its magic. 
Politics as Blood Sport and the Degradation of Democracy 
Before Donald Trump, the “take no prisoners” politics of Joe McCarthy found one of its 
most influential heirs in Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich, who served in the House of 
Representatives from 1979 to 1999 and as Speaker of the House from 1995 to 1999. This 
decidedly anti-Burkean conservative once described himself as “the most serious, systematic 
revolutionary of modern times” and told a gathering of college Republicans that “one of the great 
problems we have in the Republican Party is that we don’t encourage you to be nasty.”68  
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 According to Gingrich, Republicans needed to learn to “raise hell” and realize that 
politics is a cutthroat “war for power” where compromise is a sign of weakness that grants the 
Democratic opposition legitimacy and muddles the contrast Republicans need to make between 
the two sides. Local and state elections should be thematically nationalized by leveraging social 
divisions, grievances, and resentments to build a coalition for obtaining political power. Once in 
power, in the words of McKay Coppins, “blow up the bipartisan coalitions that were essential to 
legislating, and then seize on the resulting dysfunction to wage a populist crusade against the 
institution of Congress itself.”69 In this way, anti-government rhetoric that claims that 
government does not work becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Outside of tax cuts for 
corporations and plutocrats and appointments to the federal judiciary, political power at the 
national level is to be gained in order to nullify federal authority and return power to the states. 
 Under Gingrich’s tutelage, the Democratic opposition was to be demonized as the enemy, 
and vilification of them a normative form of political debate. In this vein, Gingrich encouraged 
the use of nicknames, such as the “loony left” or “Daffy Dukakis,” that is the calling card of 
Donald Trump. Gingrich’s goal, Coppins observes, “was to reframe the boring political debates 
in Washington as a national battle between good and evil … a fight for the very soul of 
America.”70 In this way, too, the stage was set for President George W. Bush to assert that “if 
Democrats win, the terrorists win,” and for Sarah Palin to accuse Barack Obama of “palling 
around with terrorists.” 
Of course, this blood-sport style of politics has been put on steroids by the rise of right-
wing talk radio, cable television, and digital media, which Al Gore describes in The Assault on 
Reason as “a new generation of media Machiavellis”—the most historically influential of whom 
have been Rush Limbaugh, Rupert Murdoch, and Roger Ailes.71 Working in tandem with these 
media are the hyper-partisan “think tanks” funded by libertarian plutocrats such as Richard 
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Mellon Scaife, Lynne and Harry Bradley, John Ohlin, and Charles and David Koch. These 
organizations, writes Jane Mayer in Dark Money, attempt to sow doubt about “areas of settled 
academic and scientific scholarship” and undermine “genuinely unbiased experts” in order to 
give pundits and “politicians a menu of conflicting statistics and arguments from which to 
choose.”72  
 In this media ecosphere, there are always two sides to every issue regardless of the 
evidence or distortions and outright lies. Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s famous aphorism, 
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts,” has become a quaint notion that 
has dissolved into the presentation of alternative facts, half-truths, fanciful conspiracy theories, 
and “big lies”—most recently that the election was stolen from Trump—that are circulated and 
regurgitated with impunity. Clearly, a democracy cannot function under these conditions. As 
historian Tim Snyder writes in On Tyranny, “To abandon fact is to abandon freedom. If nothing 
is true, then no one can criticize power, because there is no basis upon which to do so. If nothing 
is true, all is spectacle. The biggest wallet pays for the most blinding lights.”73 
 It is a challenge, to say the least, for those who are committed to the discovery of what 
Carl Bernstein described as “the best obtainable version of the truth” to negotiate a 
communication environment in which the mainstream media is rebranded by Sarah Palin and her 
ilk as the “lame stream media.” But, Stevens asks, “What is the mainstream media? It’s the 
journalism that believes in standards, strives to report facts, and has a professional standard to 
correct errors.”74 In contrast, in the world of Trump and his allies, we are being asked in 
Orwellian fashion to deny what we see before our very eyes. In other words, we are being lied to 
in plain sight and dared to do something about it. Stevens believes that most of the Republican 
office holders who pretend to go along with this “are not stupid men and women, though more 
than a few do a fair imitation. They all have their own justifications that amount to a personal 
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Faustian bargain predicated on the self-delusion that some particular issue or cause is more 
important than their oath of office.”75  
This brings us to the Tea Party, which emerged almost as soon as Barack Obama was 
inaugurated as president and was forced to embark on a massive government spending program 
to bring the country back from the brink of the financial collapse that was inherited from the 
Bush administration.76 The initial purported goals of the Tea Party were essentially a rebranding 
of traditional Republican opposition to taxes and calls for reducing the size of the federal 
government. This was the main agenda of the libertarian plutocrats who funded the movement, 
but the populist appeal was based more on racial animas fueled by the election of a Black 
president, prejudice against racial and ethnic minorities, and xenophobic opposition to 
immigration. It was a movement, as Palin had asserted, of “real Americans” who were fighting to 
save the country from those they claimed were destroying the nation. From here it was only one 
small step to supporting a demagogue who wanted to “Make America Great Again,” who spread 
the racist lie that Obama was not born in America, and who declared that illegal aliens composed 
of criminals and rapists were invading the sovereign borders of the United States. 
 Even more dangerously, this revanchist politics of grievance and resentment has been 
leveraged by Trump and his Republican allies to undermine democracy itself. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the primary electoral and governing strategy of the contemporary 
Republican Party has been to maintain power, not by offering policies that garner the support of 
a majority of voters, but by making it more difficult for Democratic constituencies to vote—the 
poor and people of color, those who change residential addresses, and college students.77 
Restrictions on early voting and mail ballots have now been added to this agenda. Moreover, 
radical gerrymandering and opposition to impartial methods of drawing legislative districts all 
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too often mean that Republicans are able to garner a solid majority of Congressional and state 
legislative seats even when Democrats receive a majority of votes in these elections statewide.  
 In their book How Democracies Die, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel 
Liblatt point to a number of nominally democratic nations around the world that have become de 
facto authoritarian one-party states not as a result of a military coup but of the gradual erosion of 
democratic norms and practices.78 In addition to the concerted program of voter suppression that 
is being pursued by the Republican Party, the United States has now even witnessed a violent 
insurrection, incited by an outgoing president, to overthrow a legitimate election. This 
insurrection was unsuccessful, but the country is by no means out of the woods. Even before the 
Capitol riot, Levitsky and Liblatt were concerned that Trump’s continued denial of his defeat, 
aided and abetted by his Republican allies, and the plethora of lawsuits filed by his attorneys, 
were ways to probe for fault lines in our constitutional structure.79 They worry that the whole 
post-election process has been a “dress rehearsal” for more to come and that we cannot have a 
democracy in a two-party system when one of the parties is not fully committed to this form of 
government. Fintan O’Toole puts it this way: “How do you govern where one of the two main 
parties is incapable of escaping its own willing embrace of despotism and anarchy, and where 
such a party—through the system of grossly unequal representation in the Senate, the 
gerrymandering of House districts, the packing of the courts, and the suppression of voters—is 
able to embed itself as a minority that can frustrate the will of the majority.”80 
 Not surprisingly, the rise of Trumpism in American politics and its association with 
White supremacy has raised the question of fascism, with scholars having a sobering debate 
about whether what we’ve been witnessing constitutes the real deal.81 To be sure, fascism as a 
term has been bandied about in a rather careless manner, and authoritarianism might be a more 
judicious concept to use. This is not the place for a full deliberation of this issue, other than to 
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note historian Robert Paxton’s observation that fascism should be understood as a process that 
moves through successive stages—from an incipient social movement to a full-blown fascist 
state.82 While comparisons are often made to the European-style fascism of the twentieth century, 
Paxton suggests that “the earliest phenomenon that can be functionally related to fascism is 
American: the Ku Klux Klan.”83 Paxton does not think that contemporary fascism should be 
expected to resemble classical European fascism “in its outward signs and symbols. … While a 
new fascism would necessarily diabolize some enemy, both internal and external, the enemy 
would not necessarily be Jews. An authentically popular American fascism would be pious, 
antiblack, and, since September 11, 2001, anti-Islamic.”84 It would not be cloaked in a swastika 
but in the American flag. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I examined the component parts of Movement Conservatism—the 
economic, racial, religious-cultural, national security, and politically strategic—that comprise a 
diverse coalition of interest groups and ideological dispositions united in the conviction that “big 
government” constitutes a serious threat to American society and that political power needs to be 
devolved from the federal government to the states. There are both elite and populist elements to 
this movement, which join the economic interests of corporations and plutocrats with the 
grievances of common folks, also known as “the base.” The economic policies that have 
benefited these moneyed interests have not helped the populist rank-and-file, but this 
constituency still has other groups to scapegoat and cultural concerns that distract them from 
economic issues. 
 In this context, one of the central challenges for healing our politics is the restoration of 
people’s faith that the federal government can work for them. This is no small task given the 
polarization of the electorate, inflamed by partisan media, where political parties have become 
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symbolic tribal markers of personal and collective identities.85 Here we have the politics of 
identity, a desire for recognition and dignity that cannot be reduced to economics, which has 
come to dominate the discourse of both the right and the left. This type of politics moves us 
away from universal principles that are capable of binding people together toward disparate 
group grievances and competing demands. Francis Fukuyama thinks that the remedy for this 
dilemma “is not to abandon the idea of identity, which is too much a part of the way modern 
people think about themselves and their surrounding societies … [but] to define larger and more 
integrative national identities that take account of the de facto diversity” of our nation and 
articulate how this diversity can serve common ends.86 He believes that the notion of nationalism 
or national identity has gotten a bad name because it came to be associated with White 
supremacy, but it can also be built around democratic values and the pursuit of equality, justice, 
and the common good. 
 In his book, Our Divided Political Heart, E. J. Dionne notes that the founders of the US 
Constitution understood that the individual liberty they so cherished was dependent on a federal 
government that was capable of promoting the public good, or in the words of the Preamble to 
the US Constitution, “the general welfare.” It is not a matter of more or less government, but of 
who is elected to government and of how government makes decisions and for whom. The 
founders “had confidence that government could be made to work and … could accomplish great 
things.”87 We may have been disabused of the notion that we have created a “more perfect 
Union,” but it is the true patriot, Tim Snyder believes, who “wants the nation to live up to its 
ideals. … A patriot has universal values, standards by which he judges the nation, always 
wishing it well—and wishing it would do better.”88  
 As I noted at the outside, quoting Robert Reich, Trump has taken us back to first 
principles and forced us to think about the difference between democracy and tyranny.89 Snyder 
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adds that democracy has failed in the past and is failing “in many parts of the world today. It is 
that history and experience that reveals … the dark range of our possible futures.” People may 
say that “it can’t happen here. … A patriot says that it could happen here, but that we will stop 
it.”90 
 In this endeavor, there is little prospect for productive dialogue with the revanchist strain 
of conservatism. But there is hope of communicative engagement with the descendants of 
Edmund Burke, thoughtful people who are searching for a home in today’s political 
environment. This strain of conservatism maintains a healthy respect for traditional institutions 
and is cautious about dramatic change. It is not, however, intransigent to change, is willing to 
compromise, and is desirous of consensus. 
 Stuart Stevens, for one, is not optimistic that the Republican Party he spent so many years 
fighting for will rediscover its Burkean tradition. As he writes, “Trump has made it impossible to 
ignore long-developing fault lines and failures of the Republican Party. … This moment should 
signal a day of reckoning for … all who claim it as a political identity. … I’d like to say I believe 
the party … could rise to that challenge. But that would be a lie, and there have been too many 
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